This 
Introduction
This study examines the construction of European discourse within the left-wing Turkish civil society and investigates which argumentation strategies contribute to the construction of Euroscepticism within the context of Turkey`s European Integration process. The focus on civil society is necessary as civil society actors gained more influence in this process and "the state has a legitimacy problem in maintaining its position as the primary context for politics, as a result of the shift towards civil society and culture as new reference points in the language and terms of politics,"
1 . However, not all civil society actors have been supportive of the European Integration Process. For example, in contrast to business associations that triggered the accession process, most labour unions have been critical of European Integration.
Furthermore, developments in Euroscepticism research makes such an investigation necessary. The Collaborative Research Network on Euroscepticism (Euroscepticism CRN) organised a conference entitled "Euroscepticism beyond the party system and into civil society" at Loughborough University on 5 November 2011. This event was convened on the basis of the observation that the EU integration process is no longer one driven by political parties, but the EU is engaged in an increasing dialogue with civil society. The presentations at the event examined how Euroscepticism is framed in civil society and the workshop aimed to refine and challenge the concept of Euroscepticism in considering multiple contestations of European integration and in so doing expand the research on Euroscepticism. With existing scholarly attention predominantly focused on party politics and public opinion, the question of how Euroscepticism is advanced in civil society discourse appears relatively untouched. Noting that all social actors can help to define the European question 2 , this study focuses on an analysis of leftist civil society leaders that have so far been ignored.
The decision to investigate civil society discourse through the argumentation strategy of the CSO leadership is based on the rationale that a strong leadership is present in contemporary Turkey: Kabasakal and Bodur 3 maintain that leaders have historically had huge power in Turkish society and are expected to guarantee strong leadership. Since civil society leaders 4 play an extremely important role in the national debates on European integration 5 and a strong leadership culture is present in Turkey, I will concentrate on their arguments in this thesis. I will assert, as did Diez 6 , that discourses determine action more than preconceived interests. Moreover, the perception of the EU is prone to more rapid change in developing European state, because of the rapidly changing nature of the social and economic transition. 7 To provide ample textual material to analyse the social construction of Euroscepticism, I conducted 18 semistructured interviews with CSO leaders. I then checked my results with 12 surveys to increase the internal validity of the research.
The structure of this dissertation is as follows: The literature review and theoretical approach are presented in the second part. After summing up the state of the research on Euroscepticism in theoretical and case-specific terms, the methodology will be laid out in the third part, where the research design is presented, the case selection will be justified. The empirical part sets out the ways in which Europe and the EU are systematically constructed through the interviews. The conclusion brings together the arguments from the preceding chapters, signifies new arguments and places the empirical findings in relation to the broader conceptual debates of Euroscepticism.
Definition of the Euroscepticism and Literature Review
Marks and Steenbergen's book 8 and research done by Della Porta 9 focus on social movements and fill a gap in the literature regarding perceptions of the EU within civil society. Chamorel 10 provides an important contribution to the debate by distinguishing between Euroscepticism and anti-Europeanism by undertaking a case study in the United States. Hainsworth et al. 11 analysed the Euroscepticism of the right of French politics as exemplified by elements of the extreme right, Front National, the Eurosceptic, Mouvement pour La France (founded in 1994 by its leader,
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Philippe de Villiers) and the broader Gaullist movement. This focused on the issues of extreme nationalism, the long history of nation-state building and imperialism. They conclude that for these right-wing groups, historical positions on the primacy of national unity, national sovereignty and the nation-state may lead to a deep distrust of supranational structures and institutions, and consequently opposition to the EU. 12 Milner 13 focusses on the attitudes of the main left-wing French groups to European Integration since the early 1990s. She founds that Euroscepticism is rooted in a lack of confidence in political elites, lack of democratic participation among citizens in decision-making at the EU-level and the spread of neoliberal policies and thus concludes that leftwing Euroscepticism in France can be labelled as soft rather than hard Euroscepticism according to the Taggart and Szczerbiak's 14 definition, meaning scepticism towards specific policy areas rather than principled opposition to European integration.
As for the Turkish case, analyses regarding the attitudes of domestic actors on Turkey's relations with the EU includes the roles of members of the Turkish Parliament, 15 military 16 , political parties 17 , public opinion 18 , business associations 19 and the trade unions 20 . The literature on Euroscepicism includes very few approaches that seek to understand actors beyond public opinion and political parties, with a few notable exceptions 21 . In a recent article, Fitzgibbon seeks to enlarge the study of Euroscepticism to embrace civil society and tries to develop a framework of analysis in taking social movement literature into account.
Civil Society and Case Selection
The European Union has a set of definitions of civil society. The White Paper on European Governance 22 defines civil society in reference to a broad range of CSOs, including NGOs (nongovernmental organisations) such as environmental organisations, human rights organisations, and labour-market players such as trade unions, employer associations and professional organizations. 23 Moreover, according to the EU's definitions, business associations, religious communities and the media also represent civil society. The CONECCS-EU Civil Society Database 24 considers organisations such as commercial unions, syndicates, political interest groups, local administration unions, service and production unions and religious interest groups as organisations of civil society. Apparently, the strength of a CSO is based on many variables such as the financial resources, membership profile, networking capabilities, appearance in the media etc. Therefore, I have taken such variables into consideration in selecting the cases. In selecting the cases, I examined more than twenty articles that have selected the most important CSOs for their own research in the Turkish context. After analysing various documents and articles about Turkish civil society, CSOs were selected on the basis of a combination of three qualitative criteria: 26 Qualitative, semi-structured interviews seem well placed to enable access to the type of information required for solving the research challenge presented here. In addition to factual information, semi-structured interviews can provide insights into the context within which the interaction and decision-making among the different actors takes place. By interviewing members of the elites, I had privileged access to the basic experience of the elites in the current political situation in Turkey and their perceptions of Europe.
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Critical Discourse Analysis
The notion of discourse in this dissertation is tied to a specific understanding of language, which is both an influencer on and influenced by social reality. It has a constitutive role in social structures and relations. These discourses consist of argumentation, metaphors and various linguistic tools. Similar discursive practices can be reformulated in different contexts, which can be described as intertextuality. 28 Discourses do not cause, but enable certain actions by "setting limites to what is possible to be articulated," accordingly, they lead to "political struggles" between different versions of social reality. 29 Discourse analysis is valuable in demonstrating the discursive strategies utilised by internal actors in dealing with the different visions of Europe in which these discourses play a constitutive role. This study examines an aspect that has remained largely neglected in the literature on European integration, namely civil-society based Euroscepticism via a critical perspective. More specifically, the data analysis methodology of this study is based on the multidisciplinary theoretical framework of CDA. CDA is a method of discourse analysis that deals with the relationship of language to socio-political processes and the power relations associated with them. 30 It is based on earlier studies by Foucault, Bakhtin and Gramsci, and seeks to combine linguistics and sociological approaches within the analysis of the discourse in order to examine the complex interactions between discourse and society. 31 CDA has both an ideological and epistemological content and an empirical technique. It analyses discourse as a text in context with two basic concepts. The first is 'intertextuality', meaning that texts always relate to other texts in the past or in the present. The second is 'interdiscursivity', and refers to discourses that overlap and interact with each other. Hence, in addition to providing an analytical toolkit in text analysis, the central concept of intertextuality and interdiscursivity is incorporated in the analysis. Intertextuality draws upon the connectedness of texts and transfer of main arguments, whereas interdiscursivity focuses upon the connections between discourses and in which ways they are drawn from one another. 32 Among the various distinct strands under the umbrella of CDA, this study draws closer to Wodak's discourse approach, which has been previously used in analysing the construction of European identities. 33 Wodak 34 argues that "the background of the social and political fields in which the discursive events are embedded" and thus need to be integrated into the analysis. This study tries to unmask and make transparent the kind of power relations and ideologies that have become dominant over time in the Eurosceptic discourse. CDA is the most appropriate tool for this aim, because it focusses on the deeper social forces which shape the discourse and are continuously reshaped by it. Thus, power relationships and structures affect the perception of Europe and European integration.
In sum, the approach that this study adopts is a critical approach to discourse analysis, focussing on the issues of power, hegemony and dominance in Euroscepticism in Turkey. There is still much work to be done to make Euroscepticism a conceptual and analytic unity and coherence, and it is hoped that this study can reflect and contribute to this process.
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Emprical Part: Referential, Nomination and Predication Strategies
In this section, I highlight how social actors are linguistically constructed by being named and how civil society elites refer to Europe and EU linguistically. In the following analysis, I examine the referent/nominational strategies that lie at the core of the discursive construction of civilsociety-based Eurosepticism, before proceeding to the predication strategies, namely into an analysis how certain values are attributed to these concepts. The referent/nominational strategies that lie at the heart of the discursive construction of Euroscepticism can be manifested in two main tenets.
The first important referent/nominational strategy is that Europe is, quite surprisingly, constructed as a heterogeneous entity. Leftist civil society leaders are aware of the different tendencies in the EU and, by equating the EU and the AKP (Justice and Development Party), they differentiate the left-wing tendencies in the EU. Hence, Europe and the EU are not regarded not as homogeneous entities. Nevertheless, in the following study, when expressing their scepticism towards Europe, most of the respondents were aware of the political, cultural and institutional differences within the EU. Some civil society leaders even mentioned the past wars that have been at the centre of the European project. The awareness of the non-homogeneity of the EU and Europe made the speeches more sophisticated and differentiated. I have furthermore observed that this awareness led to an adaptable approach towards Europe and the EU. If things change in the direction they support, most of the leaders are ready to soften their approach towards the EU in a pragmatic sense. Hence, they do not de-emphasise or deny the differences among the EU states. In other words, with small exceptions, the discourses show that there is an awareness of Europe's heterogeneity.
The second referential strategy refers to the in-group homogeneity in terms of ideology, but not through a Turk-European dichotomy. Several argumentative and rhetorical tools such as topoi and metaphors may be instrumental in the construction of the discourses. The first person plural pronoun "We" is important in the study of political discourse 35 . As Chilton and Schäffner 36 argue, the first person plural (we, us, our) especially can be used by respondents to conceptualise their group identity. Leftist civil society leaders use the first person plural "We" not through a national labelling such as "We Turks", but in terms of in-group ideological homogeneity. In the case of the civil society leaders, the "We" referred more to their ideological identities, rather than an in-group homogeneity. In many utterances, it is possible to find expressions such as "We Leftists". It is therefore obvious that the selective use of the first-person plural pronoun "We" provides an opportunity for civil society leaders to perspectivate their discourse. Given the hegemonic struggles in Turkey, it is perhaps not quite surprising to use the first person plural pronoun "We Turks" to build an in-group national homogeneity.
The most important predication strategy is the negative prediction of the European colonial past. The European colonial past is harshly condemned. A theme that is particularly strong in the negative presentation strategies of the discourse is the contention that the EU only considers its own interests. This particular theme of a profit-seeking Europe is such a common predication strategy that it almost makes up a topos on its own. In describing Europe, the speakers make use of positive references such as "developed social rights" or negative, value-laden adjectives such as "colonial" or "full of paradoxes". Tables 1 gives a list of predications and nominations that were utilised in the discourses: 
Argumentation Strategies
The intense contestations over the capitalist nature of the European social and political system have surfaced in the analysis mainly among the leftist (including the leftist Alevi) discourse participants. The discursive construction of Europe as a capitalist centre is realised through two major representations of Europe: Europe as a transformative and colonial power (shared by Islamic and conservative respondents) and neoliberal Europe as the diluter of labour rights and enabler of privatisation in partnership with the AKP. These two discourses are closely interconnected and dominate in the analysed data of leftist civil society leaders. Europe is commonly represented among the leftist civil society leaders as a capitalist project that transforms the accession countries according to neoliberal policies.
To begin with, the leftist civil society leader Hüseyin Demirdüzen argues that the flow of capital is for the EU more important than the democratic values in Turkey. In other words, the | 60 distribution of the capital flowing from Europe to Turkey has a greater relevance for the EU than the democracy deficits in Turkey. Moreover, as the EU is not homogenous in terms of capital, it is ultimately all about economic advantages and exploitation of the Turkish market. This argumentation strategy is visible in the following excerpt: 37 Parallel to this view, for a leader of an important labour union, Ünsal Yıldız, the EU is regarded as a project of capitalist-imperialist countries. Es1 mentions that the EU project is actually a project of the western, capitalist-imperialist countries. For him, it is not possible to say that this project is to the favour of the labour force and the workers 38 . Furthermore, according to Yıldız, when one analyses carefully, the EU process does not lead to democratization but to flexible work relations. The topos of making labour relations flexible is often used in the construction of Europe as a neoliberal centre as in the following excerpt: 39 It can be generally claimed that a border management (Grenzziehung in German) strategy comes into foreground among the leftist civil society leaders, as the EU is dominantly perceived as a neoliberal project, "at which the production of a plant is split into thousand parts and transferred where the labour force is the cheapest, so a border should be established at this point since it tries to deprive the security of the labour force and try further cheapen it". 40 Most often, Euroscepticism increases with a referential strategy to the historical practices of Turkey with the EU that had neoliberal character. For example, Hüseyin Demirdüzen refers to the Turkish political history and the neoliberal character of the EU in the following excerpt:
I see the EU as a flexibilisation of the labour force, and this flexibilisation is actually a neo-liberal project, in which the labour force has no more securities, cheap labour force is spread worldwide, that the capital cancels the borders in order to obtain more profit
The relations with the EU has reached their zenith after the military government of September 12 th , which means during this time Turkey has been governed with the laws of the EU and under the control of their institutions and the neo-liberal policies have been implemented to the full. 41 Demirdüzen further strengthens his argument in expressing that the EU has always supported privatisation, the mercerisation of health services and thus bolstered the sub-contracting and the unorganised state in Turkey and in other candidate countries. At the same time, for Demirdüzen 42 , the same Europe took an active role at the breakup of Yugoslavia. This is another referential strategy to strengthen the construction of Europe as an interest-based neoliberal organisation.
Like other leftist leaders, Kıvanç Eliaçık 43 argues that regardless of the different opinions within it, the main policy at the foundation of the EU and during the last thirty years was the fulfilment of the requirements of the new neoliberal world order. Thus, under the perspective of neo-liberalism, public services and rights are excluded. This is stated in the following excerpt:
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In all the EU countries, ambitions and opinions that focus on education, health and social security services are excluded systematically and made ineffective in the EU. Instead, the member countries focused only with a capitalist mentality on the needs of the market, so that the requests to improve the social conditions of the labour class, to reduce the inequalities and the injustice are excluded from the EU. 44 What is most striking is that the argumentation strategy of the leftist discourse points out to the harmony of AKP and neoliberal EU policies. Kıvanç Eliaçık mentions that the policy of the AKP and that of the EU follow similar principles since both are governed by neoliberal, privatisationbased and market-oriented World Bank and IMF programmes. These programmes differ from each other only with regard to their effects and results in the respective countries. Hence, while the harms and destructive effects of these policies remained limited in centrally developed European countries, they resulted in much more serious economic, political and social problems in countries like Turkey. Fahrettin Yokuş mentions the interest association between the AKP and the EU in the following: 45 According to leftist civil society leaders, in relation with the EU's radical privatisation programme, particularly the economic market programs in the fields of environment, urban development, health and social security contributed to the dramatic increase of jobs without social security, flexible and unregulated working, illegal employment, and hence poverty. Accordingly, the resulting increase of the population of workers without any social security leads to a political result, whereby dependency relationship between the AKP government and Turkish society is strengthened through the arbitrary aid provisions of the AKP, as it was the case in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. The following excerpt exemplifies the issue: 46 The excerpt above refers to the deception of the lower classes in Turkey by the AKP. 47 Moreover, Saraç 48 argues that it is not a coincidence that relations with the EU during the first years of the AKP have progressed very rapidly since the AKP implemented without any objection the programmes of the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the frame of neoliberal economic policy. It did this along with marketisation with respect to the political elimination of markets and borders, the free movement of goods, free movement of capital and as the subsequent step the free movement of labour force. To summarise, Saraç stresses that the EU is already a part of this international capitalist system. Saraç's argumentation strategy engages in constructing the harmonisation of the AKP and the EU by predicating them as implementers of neoliberal policies. However, the argumentation excludes the social rights and struggles in the EU and concentrates only on its neoliberal character to strengthen its construction. In addition to this discursive construction the argument, through the use of topos of inequality, 49 Nevertheless, in criticising the EU, the leftist discourse mainly does not regard the EU as a homogenous and a completed project. Leftist civil society leaders show high awareness of the fact that there are different approaches within the EU. They collaborate with the groups in the EU that defend that the EU is transforming itself into a social union, where borders are abolished and in which different countries and nations can live in peace together and where social rights and basic human rights are secured. However, because this approach is not supported by the entire European Union and by all European governments, and a strong Eurosceptic narrative is present. For example, Kıvanç Eliaçık mentions that they are advocates of this approach: they support a Europe where there are no borders anymore and where social rights are secured. The following excerpt shows this differentiated view regarding the EU:
There is also the other case; there are diverse approaches within the EU, which is contrary to the first dimension that support a Europe with competition, with more exploitation, with a strong European army. This approach belongs only to them and not valid for the different groups in favour of the EU membership with different visions such as the weakening of the influence of the military on the politics.
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As is typical of the leftist discourse in Turkey on the EU, the EU is not evaluated as a fixed or completed project. This argumentation strategy does not contain the argumentative fallacy of regarding the EU as static and does not essentialise it, and indicates that the struggle for a just Europe is ongoing. To illustrate, Eliaçık stresses that they want a Europe, in which the borders are eliminated and social rights are secured, and they are dedicating their efforts to this goal and feel themselves as a part of this endeavour.
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The interview data allows us to focus on the ways in which Europe and the EU is discursively constructed in the left-wing discourse. Generally, the leftist discourse condemns the double standard against labour. Even though all the necessary regulations are made regarding trade and the free movement of capital in the Copenhagen Criteria and given high priority by the European Parliament and Commission, the leftist discourse highlights that there is very little written about the granting of union rights and labour rights that would initiate the implementation of the 19 th phrase. Mainly, leftist civil society leaders criticise the EU progress reports where sometimes only the single sentence "Nothing to report," is written. Eliaçık expresses that this
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summarises the situation to a great extent and more weight should be given to labour rights and social rights. 52 Eliaçık underlines his wish that the EU should become a peace project, not an imperialist centre in the following excerpt: 53 The above excerpt from a left-wing civil society elite does not essentialise the EU and accepts its dynamic nature. However it criticises the present situation of the EU. The designation of Europe as an imperialist centre through exploitation is a common argumentative strategy in the discourse of left-wing civil society leaders. This is realised mainly through the topos of imperialism and of exploitation representing the EU as a transformative neoliberal power that acts according to its own interests. Baki Çınar mentions the importance of the leftist parts in the EU in the following: 54 In a similar vein, according to Ünsal Yıldız, the EU project is at the same time the internalisation of the neoliberal transformation programme. He argues that one of the most important justifications for the losses of many rights for workers in Turkey has been the implementation of the EU standards. If one looks at the EU standards regarding work relations, they are reorganised in a more flexible and insecure way. Ünsal Yıldız mentions that the conditions in Turkey in terms of the labour rights twenty years ago were much more extensive, and today Turkey has departed from these rights. Viewed in this light, he stresses that the EU story has not brought many positive things for Turkey. 55 Semsa Özar 56 and Baki Çınar 57 mention that vis-à-vis the extension of workers' rights progress has not been achieved in hardly any of the requests. Work life in Turkey is still regulated by the laws from the 12 September fascist coup. Whilst the EU recommended and supported Turkey to eliminate the remnants of the 12 September laws and to end the military tutorship, when it came to working life, when it was about to make legal regulations in order to allow for stronger labour organisation, these issues were almost never included in the agenda. This is also related to the issue that the EU is a capitalist project, with countries integrated into this system according to the needs of the capital. The rights and interests of the workers are in the background. Furthermore, in the leftist discourse, the common referential and argumentation strategy is to equalize the EU with the IMF, the World Bank and the USA as can be observed in the following excerpts: 59 In the first excerpt above, Necdet Saraç argues that Europe is not the cradle of democracy and sees it similar to the capitalist institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. This is a very common argumentation strategy that uses the topos of regime or system to disregard the differences among these institutions and to construct them as a part of a system. The excerpt above is an important case in which discussions on capitalist Europe lead to the interdiscursivity with Marxist and neo-Marxist thinkers. According to labour union leader Baki Çınar, 60 the IMF founded the World Bank in order to economically safeguard the rights and interests of the imperialist bloc around the USA and particularly to integrate Third World countries into this process. Accordingly, particularly after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, NATO has tried to be integrated into this system with military operations. Therefore, the EU is not an organization that is independent from this. Çınar stresses that the AKP has become a partner of the policies implemented by the imperialist block around the USA, particularly with the intensification of the crisis experienced by capitalism.
We only hear that the left, socialist, communist representative in the EU parliament notify Turkey on diverse platforms their opinions regarding the deficits, these problems, but also know that not the left groups have the word in the EU, but the capital
There are no differences between these two with respect to this foreign policy dimension. When we look at the close past, we will see that nearly the whole EU was together with the USA as a party of the intervention to Iraq. It was nearly the same situation regarding the policy against Syria, there is no difference between the politics of the EU and the USA with respect to Iran. 61 In this sense, Çınar mentions that the EU supports the politics of the USA fully. According to him, it can be accepted that there is a difference regarding the respective democracy cultures, but there is, according to their perception, no difference between the imperialism of the USA and the imperialism of the EU in terms of the politics implemented against countries like Turkey.
The leftist civil society leaders, Semra Ocak and Semsa Özar, add to the discussion in arguing that the EU can function at the disadvantage of the weak states, as was the case in Greece:
Particularly, as it has been seen during crisis periods, in a form, in which countries like Germany, France and England have imposed their own decisions to the other countries.
Thus the free decisions of countries are made invalid within the course of the process as it was the case in the sample of Greece. 62 The EU have initiated a coup without respecting the will of the Greek people with assignment from outside. 63 As can be observed in the excerpts above, the leftist leaders argue that the policy of the EU against Greece was unjust and that the case of Greece gave many lessons to countries such as Turkey. Choosing the verb "impose" can be interpreted as the discursive strategy of mitigation whereby the speaker "mitigates the illocutionary force" of a negative utterance. 64 In an interdiscursive fashion to European communists, the EU-Greece relations are interpreted in a way where the EU's attitude towards Greece is unjust. In a similar vein, Baki Çınar thinks that the policy of the EU against Greece is unfair. He thinks that the policy of the EU, particularly of the bloc around Germany, against Greece is a complete imperialist, subjugating policy: 
When one pays attention on it, it is enforced based on primarily the limitation of the existing rights of the population, the worker in order for
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As can be observed in the following, this logic also tried to implement similar applications in Greece. What is most striking at this point for the leftist respondents is that then the Greek people did not surrender to the process. For example, Çınar mentions that Greece has shown great resistance in holding firm to their own traditions and cultural roots against the subjugation politics of the EU. The meaningful thing in the issue for Çınar is this fact.
66 Semsa Özar mentions that the economic crisis diminished the image of the EU. When she looks at the EU from Turkey, she sees the following: 68 However, Ünsal Yıldız thinks that the reactions of the workers in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal against the crisis in these countries are very important. He argues that with the crisis, the workers in Europe started to remember the presence of classes again, which they had abandoned a long time ago, which is a very pleasant development. Nevertheless, due to the severe crisis in Greece, to think that this could transform the EU does not seem to be politically realistic . 69 In a similar vein, Baki Çınar predicates the EU as a capitalist project. He assesses it as a structure that was initiated with the steel union, established by the European upper class, particularly in France and Germany, in order protect the capital and to ensure that it remains strong and competitive primarily against the bloc around America and the Asian bloc around China and Japan. This argumentation strategy is observed in the following excerpt:
To build an economic block in Europe was the main aim, and took its late shape with the political integration. The EU is a structure, whereby the requests and expectations of people, freedom requests of ethnic groups in underdeveloped countries are kept in the background in general. Nevertheless, the project is though presented such. 70 This argumentative strategy suggests a discrepancy between real world practices of the EU and its rhetoric presented as its basic philosophy. Çınar adds the Customs Union Agreement to the discussion. Since 1995 Turkey has undersigned to the most important part of capitalist European project, the Customs Union Agreement. According to him, this has made Turkey from the | 66 perspective of the capitalists somehow a member of the EU by transforming it into a market. Today Turkey is integrated into the process pursuant to the expectations of the capitalists. Therefore, he concludes that the discussion about whether Turkey should become a member or not is ultimately not a historical importance for them . 71 An Alevi civil society leader expresses criticism of the Customs Union and a serious expression regarding the exploitation rhetoric of the EU in the following excerpt:
The first is that the EU will exploit you until the end and accept you then. 72 Bermek argues that Turkey is already in the EU economically, as the majority of imports came from EU, but it cannot sell anything. Bermek 73 mentions this in the following: "I mean, we sell them spare parts, but if this will be accepted or not depends on Germany. We here are workers, their temporary workers. For Europe, everything is fine, why should it accept us, what shall it do with us". He thinks that the EU has a double moral standard, meaning not only anti-imperialist worldview but also double standard resolutions in the EU plays a vital role in the Euroscepticism.
The leftist discourse combines the democracy culture and class struggles in Europe. One leader mentions that an important detail is the centuries-long class warfare in continental Europe that led to the existing democracy culture on the basis of deep roots. The obtainment of granted or existing rights is the result of the struggle of the working class. It cannot be overlooked that today these rights are protected and have been extended. This is an argumentation strategy that must be underlined as a positive attitude towards the EU in the leftist discourse in general. Additionally , Yıldız 74 argues that the guarantee of democratic rights for Turkey is not only dependent on joining the EU, and that these should be seen as values that the citizens of the country deserve. For him, it is possible for Turkey to remain out of the EU. He argues that the negotiations did not bring democracy to Turkey. According to Yıldız 75 , the negotiations have carried out, but democracy has contracted in Turkey: prisons are 110% more full, anyone who objects or speaks out -including journalists and writers -is imprisoned:
Democratisation it is not about whether we are accepted to the European Union or not, but about how the level of the basic rights in our society will be, and that this actually is related with our fight and has nothing to do with whether we get an EU member or not. 76 Moreover, leftist CSO leaders stress the importance of internal dynamics and show distrust in the EU because of its neoliberal policies. Leftist Euroscepticism emphasises that change made through internal and local dynamics rather than through external influences results in real change. According to leftist civil society discourse, the EU is a project that is based on the trends of the world system and that a country alone cannot achieve modernisation and its development through it as these are issues that can be realised with domestic dynamics, and the domestic dynamics in Turkey are not sufficiently mature:
There is increasing number of people, for whom the membership of Turkey to the EU is not a fate for Turkey and that Turkey overcomes the social struggle with its own social dynamics.
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The economic development is to be achieved through domestic dynamics and neither a hostility nor and admiration against the EU is necessary 78 Nevertheless, there are more optimistic leftist labour union leaders. A leftist civil society leader argues that the EU membership would be beneficial for the enhancement of social and labour rights and stresses that the EU accession process could be used as a tool for the improvement of the social rights and labour rights because these rights are much better established and secured in the EU 79 . For Faruk Büyükkocak, the EU has its own standards regarding working life in other countries and expectations from the EU regarding working life are not fulfilled because of the AKP. He states that although they had told them that this issue had been sent to the ILO, they obtained no reaction against the behaviour of a government that is not fulfilling the European social preconditions 80 .
In terms of health policy, a leftist civil society leader argues that impossible to talk about a EU health policy: 
Conclusion
Yıldırım 83 discovered that in the domain of Turkish labour confederations "it is the ideological configurations, the nature of their relations with the state and the EU's attitudes to Turkish membership that largely influence the Turkish peak organizations' approach to the EU". The section supported this argument to a great extent by showing that the main leftist CSO leaders use the argumentation strategy of the neoliberal EU. Compared to business organisations, a large part of the trades unions have a cautious approach towards European integration. Notwithstanding the fact that conservative trade union leaders show a tendency towards Eurocynicism, other leftist CSO leaders draw on their ideological tendencies in evaluating the EU and the European integration process, and view the EU a locus of free trade ideology. However, leftist trade union leaders stress that they tend to evaluate it positively when they observe an advancement of the labour rights, which was not the case until now in Turkey. Accordingly, trades unions and social rights have usually been seen as "the step child of the EU integration process" 84 .
Generally, the leftist leaders do not perceive the EU process strategically or as a political opportunity structure to gain influence 85 , but predominately more ideologically, as the spread of neoliberal free market policies that create an anti-labour environment. 86 Leftist leaders are more
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likely to support European integration if they believe and see that it will result through an ideological change in more benefits for labour than those available at the national level. Generally, the discourse includes criticisms regarding the negative economic results of the Customs Union Agreement and that it was unrealistic to expect the EU to improve labour rights and union freedom during the accession process. Leftist CSO leaders argue that the EU in itself is an organisation within a capitalist system, but, at the same time, they mainly accept that the social welfare state, democracy and rule of law are created by struggles of labour and constitute the main pillars of the EU. However, the accession process showed that the EU has become less and less attentive to social rights. Accordingly, they want to have close relations with European labour to change the direction of the EU.
The study of Euroscepticism so far has included mainly two specific areas: party-based Euroscepticism and public Euroscepticism. What this study aimed to articulate is the need to focus on civil society in addition to national party systems and public opinion, as non-party actors have an important function in shaping the general EU discourse 87 . Moreover, analysis of civilsociety-based Euroscepticism, of the way it develops and the content of the grievances it addresses to European integration and the EU are vital to a sound diagnosis of the crisis of confidence faced by the EU. In Turkey, as well civil-society based argumentative strategies on the EU are also operative and influential.
The leftist discourse condemns that the double standard against labour. They underline the wish that the EU would become a peace project, not an imperialist centre. Left-wing civil society leaders do not essentialise the EU and accept its dynamic nature, but they criticise the present situation of the EU. To sum up, leftist CSO leaders base their Eurosceptic arguments mainly on ideological grounds rather than strategic factors. Nevertheless, in their argumentations they regard the EU as a heterogonous entity that is open to dialectical change. Hence, The radical left is not Eurorejectionist but Eurosceptical due to their opposition to the centrality of neo-liberal policies in European integration.
The following study fills a gap which Mair 88 argues: He claims that the literature mainly focusses on "standardises quantitative variables that can be used directly in highly abstract crossnational research…We need to know more about how Europe actually plays in national political discourse, as well as about the way in which it is conceived." Besides enlarging the research field, this study contributes to the development of Euroscepticism research in suggesting that traditional categories and established theories of public and elite attitudes towards European integration fell short in explaining the Euroscepticism in non-EU countries. This leads to the conclusion that we should supplement the traditional categories and resolve contradictions by using a discursive approach.
Notes
